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KAREN PETROSKI
THE PUBLIC FACE OF PRESUMPTIONS

ABSTRACT

We commonly think of presumptions as second-best inferential tools allowing
us to reach conclusions, if we must, under conditions of limited information.
Scholarship on the topic across the disciplines has espoused a common
conception of presumptions that deﬁnes them according to their function
within the decisionmaking process. This focus on the “private” face of
presumptions has generated a predominantly critical and grudging view of them,
perpetuated certain conceptual ambiguities, and, most important, neglected the
fact that what we refer to as “presumptions” have distinguishing features other
than the defeasibility and burden-shifting eﬀects associated with their use as
inferential tools. When a decisionmaker gives reasons for a conclusion, the
decisionmaker often cites a presumption among the reasons for that conclusion;
in this guise – their “public” face – presumptions display diﬀerent, and uniquely
valuable, features that remain hidden if we understand them only as aids to
inference. This essay both surveys recent approaches to the critical analysis of
presumptions in law, philosophy, and discourse studies, and oﬀers an account of
how we might begin to think about this other, public face of presumptions.

1. I N T R O D U C T I O N

Received wisdom tells us that it is less than ideal, if not downright irresponsible,
to rely on presumptions. In law and logic, presumptions are tools allowing us to
reach conclusions when information is limited. By deﬁnition, they are secondbest devices. Common usage treats them even less charitably. To “presume” is
“to undertake without clear leave or justiﬁcation.” To be “presumptuous” is to act
on the basis of an unjustiﬁed belief, to the shame of the presumer and the injury of
those presumed against. Unsurprisingly, scholarship on the subject has focused on
either limiting or defending our use of the practice and the term “presumption.”
This essay argues for a reevaluation of presumptions, achieved through a
shift in focus. In fact, we do not use the term “presumption” only to refer to
imperfect guides to inference; we also, at least sometimes, use it to refer to a
uniquely valuable form of support for a conclusion. Recent scholarly work on
presumptions has focused solely on their internal or “private” face – the role they
play in decisionmaking processes. This focus leads to neglect of the features
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presumptions display when they are cited among the reasons in support of an
achieved decision. These features – the “public” face of presumptions – justify the
persistent use of the term in argument and explanation despite apparent consensus
on the questionable legitimacy of using presumptions to reach conclusions in the
ﬁrst place.
To justify this shift in focus, this essay describes how the private face of
presumptions has been understood, and the problems this understanding has
generated, in three contexts in which presumptions have been most extensively
discussed: legal procedure, informal argument, and public discourse about values.
The second half of the essay oﬀers some initial suggestions regarding the
function of presumptions as reasons. As it turns out, characterizing a reason as
a presumption implies unique forms of commitment on the part of the reason
giver – suggesting an independent value for presumptions quite diﬀerent from the
conventional view of them as validated, if at all, only by the absence of superior
alternatives.
2. T H E P R I VA T E FA C E O F P R E S U M P T I O N S

a. The Common Conception
All recent commentary on presumptions relies on a common conception of what
the term “presumption” refers to. This conception has two components. The
ﬁrst is that a presumption is similar to a supposition, in that it is a proposition
posited in the absence of full information, and therefore subject to defeat if further
relevant information becomes available. The second component is that in dialogue
or deliberation, presumptions, unlike suppositions, function to “shift the burden
of proof to the opponent, or to make the opponent responsible for the proof,”
as Leibniz put it in 1702 (1702/1887, 444, quoted in Gaskins 1992, 1). Bishop
Richard Whately, the nineteenth-century theologian often identiﬁed as the father
of the modern study of presumptions, also emphasized this function: “[a]ccording
to the most correct use of the term, a ‘Presumption’ in favor of any supposition,
means, not . . . a preponderance of antecedent probability in its favour, but, . . . that
the Burden of proof lies on the side of him who would dispute it.” (1828/
1852, 74)
These deﬁnitions imply that presumptions have a weight exceeding that of other
propositions based on incomplete information – that, in deliberation or argument,
presumptions might function as reasons in support of a position unless speciﬁcally
overridden by subsequent information. But as explained below, the function of
presumptions as reasons has not been a focus of recent approaches to the topic,
which ﬁx instead on the operation of presumptions’ defeasibility and burdenshifting eﬀects prior to the resolution of a dispute or the achievement of a decision.
Comparison of these more recent approaches can help to clarify the problems
resulting from this ﬁxation.
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b. Presumptions as Technical Hurdles
It is in legal scholarship that presumptions have received the greatest attention
and the greatest criticism. Their burden-shifting function is familiar to everyone
acquainted with the American legal system; it is an aspect of the most basic
procedural rule of the adversarial system, the rule that normally places the burden
of proof on the party seeking to alter the status quo. Among countless examples
of presumptions relating to more speciﬁc issues, two that are especially frequently
discussed in the scholarship are the presumption that a letter was received, based
on evidence that it was properly mailed (Allen & Callen 2003, 16–24), and the
presumption that a person is deceased, based on the absence of any evidence of
contact with or communication from the person for seven years or more (McBaine
1938, 528–9).
These legal rules involve the generation of special temporary “facts” –
eﬀectively, legal ﬁctions – based on other facts presented as evidence. Legal
presumptions also appear in other forms, especially in constitutional and statutory
interpretation. For example, judges deciding whether to apply a statute to conduct
that occurred outside the territory of the sovereign enacting the statute often
refer to a “presumption against extraterritorial application” in explaining whether
the statute applies (American Banana 1909, 357). This presumption, and many
similar tools of statutory and constitutional interpretation, are in a sense analogous
to more fact-bound presumptions. Like fact-bound presumptions, interpretive
presumptions involve a kind of authorized conventional inference about legislative
intent, based on the “evidence” of statutory text. But because these interpretive
presumptions operate outside the regime of what the law conventionally classiﬁes
as “evidence,” they have not received anything like the amount of attention
lavished on fact-bound presumptions.
The narrow focus on evidentiary presumptions in legal scholarship has not led to
clarity. It is nearly a cliché for legal articles on this topic to begin by quoting one of
any number of statements about the obscurity of the topic. Since the early twentieth
century, the central issue debated has been the precise nature of the burden that a
presumption places on the party opposing the presumption, and the procedural
implications of the answer to this question (Thayer 1898, 339; Morgan 1955). The
debate over the procedural implications of evidence-based presumptions continues
today.
To be sure, most of the participants in this debate have agreed on a few
points beyond the core deﬁnition of presumptions presented above. But these
points of agreement involve diﬃculties of their own. One point of consensus is
that because presumptions are procedural rules governing the responsibilities of
parties to a dispute, they are distinct from evidence and cannot be a source of
evidence, so juries should not be instructed to weigh a presumption against any
facts presented in rebuttal of it (Hecht & Pinzler 1978, 541 & n.76; Morgan 1937,
271, 274). Very few commentators have concluded that legal presumptions, or the
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factual propositions resulting from their operation, can and do function as evidence
(Olshausen 1943, 321, 323–34; Kaiser 1955, 261). This widely shared understanding
of presumptions as housekeeping rules distinct in kind from the evidence on which
they operate has probably encouraged an understanding of presumptions as devices
that stand apart from, and are not comparable to, the basic reasons for a legal
conclusion.
Legal commentators also widely agree that so-called “irrebuttable” or conclusive
presumptions do not deserve the name. Conclusive presumptions are legal
inferences that the law requires a decisionmaker to draw from given evidence, such
as the traditional rule that a child below a certain age is incapable of a criminal
act. The position that these are not really presumptions is directly entailed by the
common conception of presumptions: conclusive presumptions are not defeasible,
so they lack one of presumptions’ deﬁning features (Allen & Callen 2003, 3 n.7;
Hecht & Pinzler 1978, 529; Morgan 1937, 255; Olshausen 1943, 316). The standard
position on the use of the term “presumption” to refer to legal rules of this type
is that the usage results from conceptual sloppiness, a disregard for the deﬁning
features of presumptions. But decades of criticism in this vein have not made
much headway against the usage itself; such rules are still regularly referred to
as “presumptions.” This convention might be more satisfactorily explained if we
could relax the requirement that presumptions be defeasible in any given case and
any context in which they are considered, a point explored below.
A ﬁnal point agreed on by most commentators, and presupposed by current
legal practice, is that despite these perplexities the term “presumption” remains
useful. But this view has had dissenters, notably Ronald Allen, who has argued
since at least 1981 that lawyers and courts should stop using the term, since
“presumptions do not exist independently of other evidentiary devices and
procedures that go by other names,” speciﬁcally, the standards for directed
verdicts and aﬃrmative defenses (1981, 844). Allen has shown repeatedly that
the term “presumption” does not refer to anything unique as far as procedure is
concerned – yet his demonstration has had no discernible eﬀect on legal usage and
practice. Perhaps this persistence is due not to inattention to Allen’s analysis, but to
the fact that the term has meaning beyond its reference to an evidence-marshaling
inferential device.
c. Presumptions as Indispensable Starting Points for Inquiry
Philosophers who have examined presumptions have relied on the common
conception described above to draw far less critical conclusions about use of
the term “presumption” and the practice to which it is understood to refer.
Two of the philosophers who have considered presumptions at greatest length,
Douglas Walton and Nicholas Rescher, have both insisted that presumptions are
not a matter of merely technical interest but instead play a fundamental role in
reasoning – that we wouldn’t be able to agree about anything or say that we knew
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anything at all were it not for presumptions. But because both Walton and Rescher
base their analyses on the common conception, their treatments cannot resolve
the ambiguities characterizing legal scholarship on presumptions. If anything, their
conclusions further accentuate those ambiguities.
In a series of works on the subject of “presumptive reasoning,” Walton has
argued that presumptions are crucial to practical reasoning, since they are what
“enable a dialogue or an action to go ahead on a provisional basis in time to be
of some use in providing a tentative solution to a practical problem” (1996, xi).
But Walton uses the term “presumption” in two diﬀerent senses. Sometimes he
uses it to refer to speciﬁc defeasible inferences drawn from a particular set of facts.
One of his examples is the presumption that the husband of a person’s mother is
the father of that person, in the absence of reason to believe otherwise (39). Walton
also, however, uses the term to refer to the operation of what he calls “presumptive
reasoning,” forms of inference that we conventionally consider fallacious – like
slippery-slope reasoning – but that may be legitimate grounds for inference under
conditions of limited information (48–109). In this sense, presumptions are not
speciﬁc propositions but classes of provisional warrants, or perhaps the generic
results of licensed structures of provisional inference. This ambiguity mirrors the
ambiguity in legal usage, which uses the term “presumption” to refer both to legal
rules licensing certain inferences on the basis of particular evidence and to the
resulting speciﬁc conclusions (Morgan 1937, 257, 278). The ambiguity is, however,
more pronounced in Walton’s work because the schemes he examines are even
more general than the typical legal presumption. We could avoid the ambiguity
by adopting diﬀerent terms for each sense in which the term “presumption”
gets used, of course – but it is also possible that the ambiguity derives not from
carelessness but from a more basic ambiguity in the nature of presumptions, one
that can be better understood by considering how they function as reasons. As
explained below, a reason characterized as a presumption has features of both
speciﬁc propositions and general rules, and cannot be reduced to one or the other.
A similar ambiguity is present in Nicholas Rescher’s work on presumptions
(2006), although it is less evident here, since Rescher focuses primarily on
presumption as an identiﬁable phase in a ubiquitous structure of practical inference.
Rescher describes presumption as a practice of “tentative cognition,” and more
speciﬁcally as the practice of making provisional inferences in the absence of full
information; he explains how this is something we do constantly in every area of
rational inquiry (52). Only derivatively does this practice solidify into rules of thumb
for drawing particular inferences, which are also referred to as “presumptions.”
Rescher’s chief concerns are to demonstrate the ubiquity of this practice and to
justify it in what he calls “economic” terms. As he puts it, “presumption is a matter
of cognitive economy – of the eminently rational policy of following ‘the path of
least resistance’ to an acceptable conclusion” (47). This justiﬁcation, again, applies
equally to the practice in general and to particular low-cost inferential results. But
it is limited to the justiﬁcation of certain deliberative processes and their results,
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generically considered; it focuses on whether the use of presumptions can generally
be justiﬁed, not on how they are used to justify. As a result, Rescher’s defense of the
practice of presumption oﬀers no resources for resolving the conceptual problems
that have arisen in other work on presumptions. It cannot, for example, explain the
persistent use of the term to refer to phenomena that seem to lack the attributes of
presumptions understood under the common conception.
d. Presumptions as Tools for the Opportunist
Scholars studying presumptions commonly note that the shape of presumptions
in both senses – the content of both presumptive rules and the inferences licensed
by them – is determined by external norms. The presumption of paternity cited
by Walton, for example, seems to be based on a default assumption that people
conduct themselves in conformity with dominant social norms. Dale Nance (1994)
has argued that all legal burdens of proof are best explained according to a
related “principle of civility”: an assumption that, absent evidence to the contrary,
individuals acting voluntarily always conduct themselves consistently with relevant
norms. On this account, presumptions generally presuppose and promote prosocial, cooperative behavior.
Some references to presumptions, however, are not sociability-promoting. This
is particularly true in the ﬁeld of public discourse about values, explored by
Richard Gaskins in his 1992 book on burdens of proof in modern discourse.
Gaskins is interested in the phenomenon of burden-shifting in argument, not
the dynamics of defeasibility. He ﬁnds this phenomenon to be “an inescapable
feature of contemporary discourse” and explains it as “a natural consequence of
modern pluralism” (3). In particular, he examines the widespread reliance in policy
debates on the “argument from ignorance,” whereby the assertion of a principle is
accompanied by an overt or implicit assertion that if interlocutors cannot invalidate
the proposition asserted, it must be accepted as valid (2–11). Among many other
examples, he points to a twentieth-century shift in legal and popular discourse
from a presumption of perfect rationality in the operation of bureaucracies to
a presumption that bureaucracies inevitably fall short of that ideal. According
to Gaskins, this shift has underwritten successive phases of constitutional due
process doctrine as well as changes in public attitudes toward institutional authority
(83–101). And in Gaskins’s account, it resulted not from the operation of a
principle of civility but from the opportunism of actors who used burden-shifting
rhetoric to further objectives based on other commitments, including self-interest
(101–2).
Although Gaskins is critical of this dynamic, and although his emphasis is
on burden-shifting rather than defeasibility, his ultimate conclusions resemble
Rescher’s. Gaskins describes judges interpreting the Constitution, for example,
as avoiding justiﬁcation of their key assumptions by claiming the advantage of
a presumption on a particular issue and shifting the labor of justiﬁcation onto
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those who would dispute their conclusions (54–74). Gaskins thus comes closer
than any other recent commentator to considering the function of presumptions
as reasons. But for him, burden-shifting in public discourse remains a tactic for
evading argumentative responsibility – a basically antisocial act. Like Rescher, he
characterizes presumptions as propositions that are “taken” by arguers, not “given”
to an audience. The implication is that every reference to a “presumption,” and
every inferential practice conforming to the common conception, bears a hint of
illegitimacy.
e. What the Common Conception Neglects
The sense that there is something less than legitimate about presumptions explains
why commentators have focused on deﬁning their legal operation narrowly and on
elaborately justifying the use of presumptions, and the term “presumption,” outside
the law. But the emphasis on justiﬁcation and containment of presumptions,
and the reliance on the common conception, miss something important about
presumptions: the way they operate as a form of justiﬁcation.
A hint of what is missing from the approaches described above appears
in Bishop Whately’s approach to the topic. Whately is universally cited as the
originator of the modern understanding of presumptions. But Whately’s discussion
of presumptions appears in a handbook of argumentation. He was not concerned
with justifying the use of presumptions, and this was largely because he understood
them primarily as persuasive, not inferential, tools. Indeed, the core of his advice
to his readers regarding presumptions was not a warning of their illegitimacy, but a
reminder of their utility: “if you . . . suﬀer[ ] the Presumption to be forgotten, which
is in fact leaving out one of your strongest arguments, you may appear to be making
a feeble attack, instead of a triumphant defense” (1828/1852, 75). In other words,
Whately identiﬁed presumptions as things to be presented as reasons supporting
acceptance of conclusions in arguments to an audience.
Whately did not develop this point in detail, and his successors have not
explored its implications. Even Gaskins, who acknowledges the rhetorical force
of presumptions, devotes his energy to the antisociality implied by the burdenshifting eﬀects of presumptions. But as Allen points out, we have other ways of
describing the functions that presumptions, understood according to the common
conception, perform within decisionmaking processes. There are, in contrast, no
obvious substitutes for the term “presumption” in characterizing the reasons for
a decision. This asymmetry suggests that the real signiﬁcance of the term, and the
most basic distinctiveness of presumptions, might lie not in their use as aids to
deliberation, but in their characteristics as reasons.
3. T H E P U B L I C FA C E O F P R E S U M P T I O N S

Looking more carefully at what it might mean to view presumptions as reasons – at
what is implied when we characterize a reason as a presumption – allows us to avoid
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some shortcomings of previous discussions of the topic by identifying deﬁning
features of presumptions other than their defeasibility and burden-shifting eﬀects.
Below, I ﬁrst specify how presumptions function as reasons in the law, then
explore some of the vocabulary available for analysis of the judicial practice of
giving reasons, and ﬁnally explain, based on that vocabulary, what distinguishes
presumptions from other reasons.
a. Legal Reasons and Presumptions
Reason-giving plays two distinct roles in the American legal system. The parties
to a legal dispute present reasons for their positions in the form of evidence
regarding historical facts and sets of legal inferences from them. These reasons
are addressed to legal decisionmakers and are understood to provide the basis for
resolution of the dispute. After some decisionmakers resolve disputes, however,
they are also expected to provide reasons for those resolutions. These reasons
are addressed to a wider audience – subsequent decisionmakers, litigants, and the
public – and may include the reasons advanced by the parties but may also go
beyond them.
Many explanations of this second form of reason-giving describe it as persuasive
in its aim; it is widely held that courts give reasons for decisions at least in part
to legitimate those decisions and, by implication, the decisionmakers’ authority,
since the judiciary lacks other indicia of legitimacy (Schauer 1995, 637, 653–4;
Friedman 1992, 918–9). While it is unclear whether judicial reason-giving actually
secures public assent, this view of reason-giving remains intuitively plausible,
particularly given the use made by judicial decisionmakers of their predecessors’
reasons (Schauer 1991, 175–85). The practice of reliance on prior reasons allows
judicial reason-giving to serve truth-oriented ends as well. Making reasons public
allows the reasons – especially when they are generalizations – to be criticized,
revised, and strengthened by subsequent reason-givers (Allen & Pardo 2003, 1797;
Goldman 1999, 139–44; Schauer 1991, 39–43). In fact, since soliciting correction
by specifying reasons can bolster the credibility of an arguer, the truth-oriented
function of reason-giving is closely related to its legitimating purpose (Goldman
1999, 109, 142–9).
Most of the accounts discussed above address presumptions as reasons in
the ﬁrst sense – as reasons relied on by inquirers or decisionmakers, prior to
the achievement of a ﬁnal decision, as they seek to reach a correct result. The
suggestion here is that we consider afresh how presumptions function as reasons
in the second sense, when they are provided in support of an already achieved
decision to justify a particular action.1 Thinking about presumptions as reasons
in this sense – as cited to secure support for an already achieved decision and to
contribute to a longer-term approximation of truth – requires us to view them
as ﬁxed in a way foreign to the common conception. That conception sees
presumptions as events occurring along the path to a conclusion and always at risk
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of disappearing if further information of the right kind comes along. But when,
for example, a judge issues an order that cites the presumption of death after
seven years’ absence as one of the reasons for a directed verdict, the presumption
becomes a permanent reason for that decision, not one that might subsequently
disappear.2 As reasons, presumptions are not evanescent, as they seem to be when
considered as rules for presentation of proof, although they are qualiﬁed in a
diﬀerent sense, explored below.
It is possible to be more speciﬁc about how presumptions function as reasons
for an achieved decision. In a judicial opinion, references to presumptions as
reasons can take two forms, one positive and one negative. In the positive form,
a reason-giver states that a decision is based in part on the applicability of a
presumption. An order granting a directed verdict in a custody dispute might grant
custody to a relative based in part on the conclusion that another individual with
a superior claim to custody is to be considered dead for purposes of the case, and
explain this conclusion as in turn based on the parties’ failure to present evidence of
recent communications from the person together with the presumption triggered
by the absence of such evidence. Both the absence of evidence and the presumptive
rule, as well as the particular presumptive fact arising from their conjunction,
are reasons for the decision. The reference to the presumption also involves an
acknowledgment that the absence of evidence of a person’s whereabouts is a
circumstance that might not obtain in future cases, so that the same decision might
not be reached in those cases. Still, the presumptions, in both senses, will always
be reasons for this particular decision. The same implications are present in a case
citing an interpretive presumption. When a presumption is cited as a reason in this
way, it functions as a legal rule of sorts, but part of its signiﬁcance is that – at least
in theory – it might not ever apply again.
Presumptions can also be mentioned as reasons supporting a decision even
though the ultimate conclusion is that they do not apply. In a case involving the
extraterritorial application of a statute, a judge might decide that the statute does
apply to extraterritorial conduct despite the presumption against extraterritorial
application, but mention the presumptive rule anyway in the course of explaining
the reasons for this decision. In such a case, the presumption forms one of the
reasons for the decision, even though it is not accompanied by a presumed “fact”;
it supplies the standard overcome by the considerations favoring application of the
statute, which will also ordinarily be presented as reasons for the decision. In this
context, the eﬀect of mentioning the presumption is, again, to qualify the scope of
the decision; mentioning the presumption warns that the decision at hand should
not be generalized into a rule.
As I have just described them, presumptions seem to resemble other legal rules
but to be less absolute than many other such rules. Superﬁcially, this might seem to
be just a diﬀerent way of describing presumptions as defeasible. To move beyond
this description, it is necessary to consider other features of the practice of reasongiving.
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b. Some Features of Reason-Giving
Although the practice of giving reasons is important both in and outside law,
no standard vocabulary for analysis of the practice exists. Instead of trying to
synthesize the disparate approaches to the topic, I will focus on one approach,
Frederick Schauer’s discussion of judicial reason-giving in a 1995 article, since
it suggests a way of moving decisively beyond the common conception of
presumptions.
Schauer makes two key points in this article. One is a point about the acts of
generalization he considers to be inherent in the practice of reason-giving; the other
is a point about the commitments implied by that practice. First, Schauer maintains
that the practice of reason-giving is a special case of the practice of generalization.
According to him, a reason must be “more general than the outcome it purports
to justify”; otherwise, it does not “count as a reason” (635). His second point is
that the practice of reason-giving by deﬁnition involves a form of commitment
on the part of the reason-giver, since the eﬀect of citing a generalization as a
reason is to commit the person citing the generalization to application of the
same generalization in future cases (642–5). On closer analysis, the ﬁrst of these
points, concerning generalization, seems problematic and the second point more
fundamental, although Schauer presents his point about commitment as derivative
of his point about the generality of reasons.
The point about generalization is rendered problematic by experience and
common usage. In law and in other forms of justiﬁcation, factual propositions
can and do often function as reasons alongside generalizations. Judicial opinions
frequently cite evidence as well as norms among the reasons for particular
outcomes. Indeed, rules could not provide support for an outcome if they were
not related to the facts of the case. While Schauer acknowledges that judicial orders
sometimes refer to factual ﬁndings, his deﬁnition of reason-giving excludes facts
from the category of reasons without much explanation (637).3 In addition to being
inconsistent with everyday practice, deﬁning reasons as general rules presupposes
a categorical distinction between factual issues and legal rules or norms that tends
to fall apart under close examination (Allen & Pardo 2003).
If facts can serve as reasons alongside rules, what does this imply for Schauer’s
point about commitment? Schauer links this point to his deﬁnition of reasons
as generalizations: by pointing to a generalization as a reason for a decision,
the reason-giver becomes committed to making a similar decision in future
cases presenting suﬃciently similar circumstances (642–5). Schauer oﬀers several
justiﬁcations, derived from this implied commitment, for the practice of reasongiving: because it involves commitment, reason-giving ensures legal stability,
protects reliance interests, and can correct for bias resulting from a judge’s attitude
toward particular facts (653). He also suggests a further implication of reasongiving, without linking it directly to his observations on commitment: the practice
of giving reasons can be “a sign of respect” for the subject of the decision, “a way
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of opening a conversation rather than foreclosing one” (658). A decisionmaker
who gives reasons acknowledges that the recipients of the decision are entitled
to more than just the say-so of the decisionmaker, that they are to some extent
entitled to draw their own conclusions about the acceptability of the decision
and, perhaps, to criticize it (637). Really, this is simply another way of describing
reason-giving as a tactic of legitimation. But in addition, by providing reasons,
the decisionmaker actually enables the recipients of the decision to articulate
and justify the independent conclusions they reach about the acceptability of
the decision. In this way, a reason-giver commits him- or herself to a form
of cooperation, and the reason-giver cannot completely escape the implications
of this commitment, even if, as in Gaskins’s account, the reasons provided are
disingenuous. Further, this type of commitment is involved in the giving of any
kind of reason, including both factual reasons and normative generalizations. In
this sense, the commitment involved in reason-giving remains valuable even if not
all reasons are generalizations, and even if some may be characterized as evasions
of responsibility.
c. What Types of Reasons Are Presumptions?
What does all of this have to tell us about how presumptions function as reasons?
In this section, I brieﬂy discuss, ﬁrst, how reasons characterized as presumptions
display features associated with both factual and rule-like reasons, and then the
forms of commitment this type of hybrid reason involves.
The description of a reason as a presumption, whether the presumption is
cited as applying or as overcome, qualiﬁes the conclusion and warns recipients
that the decision and any generalizations apparently warranting it should not be
used as reasons in subsequent decisions without additional analysis. Presumptions
resemble factual reasons, then, in that describing a reason as a presumption
carries no implied guarantee that the reason will ever function as a reason in any
future case – such a description abjures the main forms of commitment analyzed
by Schauer in his account of reasons-as-generalizations. At the same time, the
traditional legal view of presumptions as more akin to legal rules than to facts is
also justiﬁed. Like a more absolute rule, a presumptive rule provides a warrant for
reaching one conclusion rather than another given a particular set of circumstances
(and this is true of both rebuttable and irrebuttable presumptions). Presumptions
are more than mere factual reasons; they connect facts to a conclusion and justify
acceptance of this conclusion on the basis of these facts. In this sense, even though
they are guaranteed to be good for one case only, presumptions resemble rules
more than facts.4
The way in which presumptions combine features of factual reasons and rules
also implies particular forms of commitment on the part of any person describing
a reason as a presumption. Characterizing a reason as a presumption commits
the reason-giver not just to the generalization implied by the presumption but
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also to a particular factual scenario. In standing behind the decision, the reasongiver stands behind the accuracy of a particular description of the world as
constituted by the evidence in the case. Only under that description of the world
does the presumption function as a reason. In this way, characterizing a reason
as a presumption commits the reason-giver to more than does characterizing a
reason as a rule. In addition, characterizing a reason as a presumption involves
acknowledgment of the possibility that the reason will not apply in some or
any future cases. This in turn makes each reference to a presumption into a
reminder to subsequent decisionmakers of their own obligations to give reasons;
subsequent decisionmakers cannot persuasively cite the presumption as a rule
without explaining its relationship to the facts of their own cases. Characterizing
a reason as a presumption thus acknowledges the contingency of reasons in
a way that goes a step beyond the similar acknowledgment implied in every
presentation of a rule as a reason (Schauer 1991, 35–6). When a reason is identiﬁed
as a presumption, the reason-giver acknowledges not just the contingency of the
decision’s legitimacy on its acceptance by the decision’s recipients, but also the
fact that this legitimacy is contingent on the circumstances of the case, that other
decisionmakers might reach other conclusions under other circumstances, and that
all similarly situated decisionmakers are under an obligation to give reasons.5 No
other type of reason commits a reason-giver to precisely this set of attitudes.
It is easy to think of any reference to a presumption as exhibiting a
fear of commitment. But if my description is accurate, describing reasons as
presumptions actually commits the reason-giver to both more and less than does
describing reasons otherwise – as either rules or facts. The set of commitments
involved – including commitment to the facts at hand, to the contingency of
the decision both immediately and over the long term, and, above all, to the
perpetuation of a practice of reason-giving – is communicated every time a reason
is described as a presumption. Whether we view such a description as unusually
honest or as an evasion of responsibility depends on considerations lying beyond
the scope of this essay, such as the nature of the obligation to give reasons and the
beneﬁts and consequences of diﬀerent approaches to reason-giving. Regardless of
our evaluation of the practice, looking at presumptions in this light reveals that
they play a distinct and valuable role, one that remains hidden as long as we take
the common conception to be the only way of understanding them.
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NOTES

1 The practice of oﬀering reasoned decisions exists at least partly to justify particular
judicial actions as well as the actions commanded by the court. In this light, the reasons
given seem to be oﬀered as reasons for action, not reasons for belief. But the function
of reasons in judicial opinions blurs the distinction that philosophical analysis commonly
draws between reasons for action and for belief. For one thing, the practice of giving
reasons can be understood as motivated by a goal of truth approximation. In addition, as
a legitimating tactic, reason-giving provides recipients with a basis for accepting a judicial
action as a justiﬁed exercise of authority. This secondary action, if it occurs – the act of
accepting authority – consists of a belief; acquiring the belief that the action was justiﬁed
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2

3

4

5

is identical with the act of conferring an important form of legitimacy on the action. I
thank Walter Sinnott-Armstrong for encouraging clariﬁcation of this point.
Sometimes, a party will be able to reopen such a decision by pointing to new evidence,
and in this case the reason characterized as a presumption would indeed disappear. But
the legal system strongly discourages the revisiting of judgments and erects numerous
obstacles to such a result. In most circumstances, the decision – and the reasons for
it – will be ﬁxed when the decision is announced. I thank Larry Laudan and Ron Allen
for helping me to clarify this point.
This position seems to be in potential tension with the position taken by Schauer (1991)
in his work on the defeasibility of legal rules. There, Schauer argues that although we
claim to use rules as if they were inﬂexible, most are in fact subject to defeat under
certain circumstances (35–6, 196, 203–4). Indeed, he suggests that many if not all rules
should be understood as “presumptive,” although he distinguishes his sense of this term
from the sense used in evidence law (203). If the characterization presented in this essay
is sound, the distinction might not be necessary. Presumptive rules, as reasons, are in fact
just rules that are, to varying degrees, especially explicit about their defeasibility.
Because of their fact-sensitivity, presumptions might seem to resemble standards
– rules’ ﬂexible cousins – more than rules. Yet presumptions diﬀer from standards,
too. Standards leave open the method by which a decision under the standard
is to be reached (Friedman 1992, 922–5, 941). As persuasive devices, then, they
may be suboptimal (Schauer 1991, 77–8). Presumptions, in contrast, endorse and
reﬂect a more structured process – dissected at length in accounts of the common
conception – in which a decisionmaker has provisionally taken a general rule as given,
then examined the context for speciﬁc defeating factors (Schauer 1991, 230). References
to presumptions thus communicate a more systematic, less arbitrary relationship between
reasons and conclusion than do references to standards, and greater sensitivity to
particulars – perhaps conducing to greater accuracy – than do references to rules.
This acknowledgment is implied as well in references to irrebuttable and interpretive
presumptions. Describing a reason as an irrebuttable presumption highlights its status as
a legal ﬁction – a principle whose validity is contingent on cooperation.
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